For example, the linguistic turn, the hermeneutic turn, the pragmatic turn, among others. Numerous turns have characterised the development of philosophy over recent decades. By displacing the Distributive Paradigm, these authors not only restrict to a strictly economic question Rawls’s conception of primary goods, but they also fail to grasp the moral and political perspective of his project, a perspective firmly based on reciprocal recognition and self-respect.
In this sense, my philosophical exercise is heading in a direction directly opposed to the recommendations made by Iris Marion Young in Justice and the politics of difference when she declared that “the concept of distribution should be limited to material goods” (Young 1990:8). Once I have clarified that distinction, I shall defend the thesis according to which the conception of distributive justice defended by Rawls not only exceeds the margins of allocative justice but also offers sufficient arguments to meet the requirements of recognition. The core of this misunderstanding is the failure to distinguish between allocative justice and distributive justice. In this paper I show that underlying those approaches is a mistaken understanding of distributive justice, especially of the conception developed by John Rawls in A theory of justice.
0 kommentar(er)
